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THE IMPACT OF AIRLINE SIZE 
UPON EFFICIENCY AND PROFITABILITY
by
H. Barry Spraggins 
University of Nevada-Reno
INTRODUCTION
With the enactment of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 
deregulation of the nation's airlines officially began in 1979.1 De­
regulation of the airlines was accompanied by a series of setbacks: 
fuel prices more than doubled between 1978 and 1981, and the 
surge in costs, coupled with the 1981-1982 recession, inflicted huge 
losses on the industry. The 1981 air-traffic controller strike and the 
aftermath of firing of more than 11,000 air-traffic controllers sharply 
restricted the number of flights at the large U.S. airports. Airlines 
stretched out or cancelled plane orders and even grounded part of 
their fleets.2 Also adding to the chaos was the entrance of new 
airlines such as Peoples Express.3
Following the 1978 banner sear of S1.365 billion in operating 
profits, the U.S. airline industry lost nearly $1.4 billion from 1980 
through 1982.4 Profits reached S310 million in 1983, about $2.1 
billion in 1984, around $1.4 billion in 1985, $1.3 in 1986, and a 
record $2.46 billion in 1987.5'6,7'8
The overall airline recovery since 1983 is attributed to a number 
of factors. Among them, fuel prices which account for one quarter 
of an airline's operating expenses, have remained more stable.
Many airlines have received concessions from their labor forces. 
Tough cost cutting measures have been implemented. The wiser 
use of new routes has been a contributor, and a strong economy
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during this period has also had a very positive effect on the airlines.9 
This recovery follows on the heels of a post-deregulation transition 
which saw competitive forces challenge the market dominance of 
established carriers.
Even with the good profits of recent years for air carriers as a 
group, certain individual airlines such as Eastern have not shared in 
the gains. Also on the negative side, statistics show that 21 of 36 
airlines certified before deregulation are no longer operating, 84 of 
all new entrant airlines since deregulation no longer exist. These 
changes have resulted from merger, liquidation, and decertifica­
tion.10'11'12'13'14
The effect of size or scale on economic performance is a key 
aspect of the economies of business enterprise and industrial 
organization. The trend with the passage of time for companies to 
become larger through mergers as well as growth makes it of 
particular interest to obtain objective measures of the economies or 
diseconomies and other effects of increasing scale.
The key question to be answered in this paper is whether size 
has been associated with improved efficiency and profitability. This 
paper attempts to analyze efficiency and profitability difference of 
U.S. airlines according to firm size within a segment of the U.S. 
airline industry. This is a topic of current importance because of the 
great structural changes, particularly mergers, that have occurred in 
the airline industry since deregulation and the implications for future 
optimum airline size that would best serve the public interest and 
the nation's need for a dependable and efficient airline industry.
AIRLINE TRENDS
An examination of several airline operating characteristics is an 
appropriate beginning for the analysis. Table 1 shows relevant 
airline operating statistics from 1978 through 1988.15>16,17
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Graphically, it can be seen in Figure 1 and Figure 2 that both 
revenue-passenger miles and available seat miles have each risen 
around 60 percent since the slump of 1981. The trend for both 
since 1981 has been a relatively smooth upward movement.
Due to the nature of the airline industry, high fixed costs made 
marginal revenue/additional revenue contribution an important 
aspect of operating income. Thus, advantage of increasing demand 
by the traveling public.
In Figure 3, the load factor which is a result of available seat miles 
being divided by revenue-passenger miles, has been erratic over the 
time period. After climbing to a high of 63% in 1979, just when 
deregulation was to take effect, it fell sharply in 1980 to 59%. Since 
1981, although the individual years have been inconsistent, the trend 
has been upward. A post-deregulation higher level of 62.7% was 
reached in 1988.
The operating ratio, the amount of operating revenue used for 
operating expenses, has varied considerably since 1978. It has ranged 
from a low of 97% in pre-deregulation 1978 to a high of 102% in 1982. 
Since 1982 the airlines have succeeded in returning the ratio to a more 
profitable level. Figure 4 shows the ratio.
From Figure 5, operating income dropped drastically after 1978 
to a deficit of minus 5733,435,000 in 1982. This drop was probably 
due to a combination of factors ranging from price competition on 
competing routes among the carriers in a deregulated environment to 
the economic climate. After 1982, operating income returned to 
profitable levels. In 1987, the carriers as a whole realized their highest 
operating income on record.
In addition to collective airline operating statistics, individual 
airline operating characteristics such as market share, merger trends, 
and the interface between these two elements are germane to this 
analysis. Market shares of enplanementsfor all of the major U.S. airlines 
from 1978 through 1987 are shown in Table 2.18
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TABLE 1
AIRLINE INDUSTRY OPERATING STATISTICS 1978-1988
YEAR REVENUE PASSENGER 
MILES (000)
AVAILABLE 
SEAT MILES (000)
LOAD FACTOR 
%
OPERATING 
REVENUE (000)
OPERATING
EXPENSES (000)
OPERATING
RATIO
OPERATING 
INCOME (000)
1978
1979
226,781,368
262,023,375
368,750,530
416,126,429
61.50%
63.00%
22,883,955
27,226,665
21,519,092
27,026,610
0.940
0.993
1,364,863
200,055
1980
1981
255,192,114
248,887,801
432,535,103
424,897,230
59.00%
58.60%
36,662,555
36,662,555
33,949,421
37,117,325
1.007
1.012
(221,615)
(454,770)
1982
1983
259,643,870
281,829,148
440,119,206
464,537,979
59.00%
60.70%
36,407,635
38,953,672
37,141,070
38,643,262
1.020
0.992
(733,435)
310,410
1984
1985
304,458,727
336,403,021
514,010,029
547,788,432
59.20%
61.40%
43,825,047
46,664,414
41,673,536
45,238,150
0.951
0.969
2,151,511
1,426,264
1986
1987
366,283,158
404,307,784
606,847,601
648,414,398
60.40%
62.40%
50,524,933
57,020,400
49,201,832
54,561,111
0.974
0.957
1,323,101
2,459,289
1988 411,628,429 656,866,299 62.70% N/A N/A N/A N/A
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TABLE 2
U.S. AIRLINES PERCENT MARKET SHARE OF ENPLANEMENTS 1978-1987
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
United 14.95 11.38 11.27 10.03 11.84 12.57 12.82 10.87 12.96 13.21
American 10.20 9.98 9.00 9.10 9.99 10.43 10.67 11.56 11.83 11.63
Eastern 13.91 13.75 13.77 13.22 12.66 12.99 11.91 11.70 10.84 11.60
Delta 13.32 12.96 13.44 12.89 12.16 12.22 11.68 11.15 13.67 13.46
Piedmont 1.66 1.76 1.99 2.60 3.07 3.69 4.46 5.06 5.85 5.77
U.S. Air 4.72 4.62 4.95 4.89 5.29 5.36 5.33 5.40 5.57 5.44
Northwest 3.42 3.74 4.01 4.13 4.10 4.22 4.13 4.09 5.24 9.29
Continental 3.40 3.18 2.83 3.11 3.63 3.40 3.48 4.52 5.23 9.56
Transworld 7.25 7.26 7.10 6.67 6.30 6.19 5.78 3.84 6.14 5.62
Republic ___ 1.82 4.14 6.21 6.51 6.30 4.75 4.80 3.77 ___
People Express ... — — 0.30 1.02 2.23 3.07 4.14 3.38 —
Southwest — 1.70 2.58 2.85 3.26 3.58 3.77 3.70 3.33 2.83
Pan Am 3.19 2.88 5.30 5.62 4.43 4.69 4.05 3.65 3.20 3.19
Western
Pacific
4.09 3.85 3.44 3.41 3.61 3.73 3.33 3.39 — —
Southwest ... 2.76 2.09 2.26 2.56 2.69 2.45 2.53 2.73 2.66
TABLE 2 CONTINUED
U.S. AIRLINES PERCENT MARKET SETARE OE ENPLANEMENTS 1978-1987
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
American West 0.10 0.75 1.44 1.83 2.39
Air Cal 0.92 0.92 1.03 1.29 1.23 1.18 1.25 1.25 1.29 1.31
Frontier 2.10 2.10 2.10 2.33 2.11 2.10 2.20 1.92 1.18 ...
Ozark 1.09 1.30 1.20 1.54 1.00 1.01 1.55 1.50 1.00 —
Flawaiian 1.39 1.22 1.10 1.08 1.14 0.80 0.94 0.94 1.00 1.15
Aloha 1.02 0.90 0.94 0.97 0.98 0.72 0.74 0.70 0.73 0.78
Braniff 4.2!> 4.02 4.23 3.87 1.41 ___ ___ ___ ___
National 2.57 2.12 ... — ... ... — ... ... ...
Hughes Airwest 2.30 1.02 1.31 — — ... ... ... ... ...
North Central 2.48 1.20 ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
Southern 1.51 0.71 — — ... — — — ... ...
Texas Inti. 1.47 1.49 1.51 1.38 1.19 — ... ... — ...
Source: Air Transport World, Jan. 1, 1988, p. 11.
It is clear that most of the large carriers already operating before 
1978, lost traffic share after deregulation, especially during the initial 
years of deregulation. United Airlines has to yet regain the share 
enjoyed before deregulations. American's share was below 1978 
levels until 1985. The 1985-1986 increase was due partly to the 
strikes at United and TWA in those years. But the fact remains that it 
did not surpass its 1978 share level until 1985, six years after 
deregulation. Eastern has seen a fairly steady erosion of its market 
share since 1978. In addition to the problems encountered by all 
airlines in the deregulated environment, Eastern has encountered a 
multitude of other problems, not the least being labor and its 
interface with non-union sister Continental. Delta has also experi­
enced a steady decline of market share since deregulation. Only 
because of the merger with Western does Delta's share show a 
significant increase beginning with 1986. Piedmont and U.S. Air are 
two smaller carriers that have been able to gain market share during 
this era of deregulation. Northwest Airlines was able to increase 
market share during the initial years of deregulation even before it 
merged with Republic. Much of this increase was due to its interna­
tional operations, where deregulation did not apply. In fact, during 
the period from 1979 to 1985 its domestic traffic actually declined. 
Continental's share has increased since deregulation; a significant 
share was gained at the expense of Eastern. TWA even after the 
merger with Ozark in 1986 has continued to show an erosion in 
market share. Pan American merged with National in January 1980. 
Following their merger, their combined traffic share has declined in 
every subsequent year. For the airlines formed since deregulation 
the results have been mixed. Peoples Express was merged into 
Texas Air. American West has steadily increased its share since 
inception. The case is similar for Air Cal.
Market share can also be viewed from the perspective of 
individual airports. Before deregulation, C.A.B. studies showed that 
the ideal competitive balance at major airports was three carriers 
with full flight schedules. Today, however, more than half of the 
flights in an increasing number of cities are provided by a single car­
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rier. For example, Northwest controls over 80% of the gates at 
Minneapolis; U.S. Air has more than an 80% share at Pittsburgh; 
Piedmont 80% at Charlotte; and United and Continental share most 
of the gates at Denver.
Market share whether from the perspective of air carrier 
Enplanement or individual airport gate dominance has been signifi­
cantly impacted by the wave of airline mergers since deregulation. 
Between May 1985 and December 1987 alone, twenty-four 
acquisitions and mergers involving U.S. airlines operating jet aircraft 
in scheduled passenger service occurred. Among the more signifi­
cant mergers or acquisitions during this period were American and 
Air California; Delta and Western; Eastern, Continental, Peoples 
Express, Frontier, New York Air, and Butt; Northwest and Republic; 
Trans World and Ozark. Seven major carriers are all that remain 
today of the eleven trunk carriers that existed in 1978. These seven 
carriers account for over 86% of the total market share of all U.S. 
airlines.19
METHODOLOGY
The study examined 13 domestic airlines.20'21-22< 23-24,25'26 All of 
the majors were included except pan Am and Continental. Alaskan 
and Hawaiian airlines were also included in the data. The years 
1978 through 1987 were analyzed. Because deregulation took 
effect in 1979, 1978 was chosen as a starting point for a pre­
deregulation comparison with the deregulated years since.
In an attempt to obtain a measure of firm size, three different 
representations were used: total assets, available seat miles, and 
number of employees. It was hoped that if a significant relationship 
was masked by a weakness in one indicator of size, analysis of one 
or more of the other standard would lead to more meaningful re­
sults. Profitability in this study was measured by operating income 
which is the operating revenue less operating expenses. Efficiency
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was measured by the operating ratio. The operating ratio is the 
proportion of operating revenues consumed by operating expenses. 
This is a good statistic for a firm's relative performance on the 
question of cost versus revenue. It is generally thought to be one of 
the best indicators of operating efficiency.
Correlation and regression analysis of firm size in relation to 
various profitability measures were the prime analytical tools used. 
The major question examined in this paper is quite simple. As the 
size of an airline increases, does operating efficiency increase or 
decrease and does profitability increase or decrease more than 
proportionately with adjustments in airline size?
FINDINGS OF THE ANALYSIS
Results of the correlation analysis of the 13 airlines examined 
from 1978 through 1987 are presented in Table 3. Looking at the 
airline profitability in terms of operating income and the influence 
size has on this profitability, the three representative measures of 
airline size generally tended to follow the same pattern. When total 
assets are used as predictor of operating income, significant correla­
tions are found for the pre-deregulation year of 1978 and for the 
years of 1984-1987. For the years 1979-1983 correlations are very 
weak or nonexistent. Figure 6 shows the regression of this relation­
ship for 1987.
The relationship of available seat miles to operating income 
produces mixed results over the years. Available seat miles provides 
predictability of operating income for 1978, 1984, 1985, and 1987. 
No significant correlations were found for the intervening years. 
Figure 7 reflects this relationship for 1987.
Using number of employees to predict operating income was 
not conclusive. The years 1978, 1984 and 1985 showed good 
relationships. In 1987 some relationship existed, but the other years 
were very weak. Figure 8 shows the weak relationship in 1987.
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TABLE 3
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS (R2) 13 INDIVIDUAL AIRLINES
1 978 1 ‘>79 1 980
Operating Income
1981 1982 1 983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Total 75.5 7.4 22.6 4.1 28.2 5.5 80.5 70.2 35.9 61.3
Assets S. N.S N.S. N.S. N.S N.S. S. S. S. S.
Available 70.7 2.2 22.6 2.2 32.5 32.5 2.3 52.9 13.6 40.3
Seat Miles S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N S N.S. S. S. S.
Employees 73.1 3.2 9.5 1.1 25.4 0 71.1 52.7 14.8 37.0
S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. S. S. N.S. S.
S = The correlation is statistically significant.
N.S. = The correlation is not statistically significant.
TABLE 3 CONTINUED
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS (R2) 13 INDIVIDUAL AIRLINES
1978 1979 1980
Operating Ratio
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Total 31.4 10.3 0 0.1 0.1 0.9 12.4 0 2.3 2.1
Assets S. N.S N.S. N.S. N.S N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
Available 29.3 1.7 .1 0 0.2 0 10.1 0.4 0.1 0
Seat Miles S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
Employees 28.6 6.9 0.4 1.3 0.1 0 6.7 3.5 12.2 0
S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
S = The correlation is statistically significant.
N.S. = The correlation is not statistically significant.
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Generally, the lower the operating ratio, the better the chance 
for operating efficiency. When using the three representations of 
firm size to predict efficiency in operations as indicated by the 
operating ratio, virtually none of the measures, total assets, available 
seat miles, or number of employees, indicated any significant 
relationships for any of the years except 1978. In 1978 a somewhat 
weak relationship between the three size measures and operating 
ratio was found. Figure 9 shows an example of the "scatter" of 
available seat miles for 1987
Some general observations concerning the individual airlines in 
recent years, namely 1985, 1986 and 1987, should be noted. The 
largest airline in terms of assets, American, has consistently shown 
the highest operating income during this period. The airline with the 
smallest assets, Hawaiian, has had the lowest or next to lowest 
operating income during the period. The airlines with the highest 
available seat miles during these years have not had the highest 
operating income, but the airlines with the fewest available seat 
miles have generally had the lowest operating income. The airlines 
with the largest number of employees have not had the highest op­
erating income, but the airlines with the fewest number of employ­
ees have had the lowest operating income.
As far as the relationship of size to operating ratio is concerned 
during 1985, 1986 and 1987, American airlines with the most assets 
in 1985 had one of the lowest operating ratios, but that subse­
quently rose in 1986 and 1987. It might also be noted that in 1987 
the airline with the smallest assets had the highest operating ratio. 
The airline with the highest number of available seat miles in 1985, 
United, also had the highest operating ratio of 1.06. In 1987, the 
airline with the lowest available seat miles, Hawaiian, had the 
highest operating ratio. In 1985, the airline with the largest number 
of employees had the highest operating ratio. In 1987 the airline 
with the fewest number of employees, Hawaiian, had the highest 
operating ratio.
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In an attempt to gain additional insight, the 13 airlines were 
broken down into two groups for comparison in 1985 and again into 
two groups in 1987, as shown in Table 4. For the 1985 grouping, 
airlines with less than $4 billion in assets were grouped together and 
those with assets in excess of $2 billion were grouped together. The 
1987 groupings were based on airlines with assets in excess of $4 
billion and those with less than $4 billion in assets. The year 1986 
was excluded for comparison because of the numerous consolida­
tions that occurred during the year.
For 1985 both size categories showed significant relationships 
between "the three measures of size; total assets, available seat 
miles, and employees; and operating income. A dichotomy appears 
when the size measures are correlated with the efficiency measure 
of operating ratio. The smaller sized carriers showed a significant 
correlation between size measures and the operation ratio, but the 
largest airlines reflected no relationship.
The differences become even more visible when a 1987 
comparison is made. Generally, these two groupings are cases 
where the larger carriers have become larger in 1987, primarily as a 
result of mergers such as Delta and Western, and the smaller carriers 
have shrunk in number. But the smaller carriers continue to show a 
significant correlation between the of size and operating income. 
FHowever, the larger carriers do not even show how a relationship 
between size and operating income as they did in 1985. As in 1985 
when it comes to a comparison between the two groups for size 
measure and the relationship to operating ratio, the small carriers 
have a positive relationship while the larger carriers have little or 
none.
When the above groupings were compared on a basis of 
averages, significant differences were even more apparent. Accord­
ing to the computed Figures in Table 5, the smaller sized carriers 
were more profitable in relation to their size measure than the larger 
carriers in 1985. The small airlines had operating income equal to
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TABLE 4
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS (R2) 13 INDIVIDUAL AIRLINES - GROUPED
1985
Operating Income Operating Ratio
Total
Assets
Group I
78.6
S.
Group II
86.6
S.
Group I
72.9
S.
Group II
5.1
N.S
Available 69.3 53.2 51.4 0
Seat Miles S. S. S. N.S.
Employees 90.4 48.6 76.0 0
S. S. S. N.S.
Group I: Assets less than $2 Billion-Alaskan, Hawaiian, U.S. Air, Piedmont, Republic, Western, Ozark. 
Group II: Assets more than $2 Billion-Eastern, TWA, Northwest, Delta, United, American.
TABLE 4 CONTINUED
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS (R2) 13 INDIVIDUAL AIRLINES - GROUPED
1987
Operating Income Operating Ratio
Total
Assets
Group III
79.5
S.
Group IV
9.5
N.S.
Group III
64.3
S.
Group IV
20.2
N.S
Available 90 17.5 57.1 0
Seat Miles S. N.S. S. N.S.
Employees 78.8 9.5 56.7 0
S. N.S. S. N.S.
Group III: Assets less than $4 Billion-Alaskan, Hawaiian, U.S. Air, Piedmont.
Group IV: Assets more than $4 Billion-Eastern, TWA, Northwest, Delta, United, American.
TABLE 5
COMPARATIVE OPERATING INCOME RATIOS OF STUDY GROUP
1985
Group I Group II
Average Operating Income $52,991,00 $213,102,660
Average Assests $926,578,420 $4,060,905,500
Average Available Seat Miles 11,520,540,000 47,785,756,000
Average Number of Employees 8,336 35,174
1987
Group III Group IV
Average Operating Income $111,019,500 $260,515,830
Average Assets $1,412,606,500 $5,454,687,300
Average Available Seat Miles 12,371,715,000 61,168,176,600
Average Number of Employees 10,071 46,970
1985
Group I Group II
Operating Income as % of
Total Assests
Available Seat Miles Per $1 of
5,7% 5.2%
Operating Income Generated 
Operating Income Generated
217,405 224,238
Per Employee $6,356.89 $6,059.20
1987
Group III Group IV
Operating Income as % of
Total Assests
Available Miles Per $1 of
7.85% 4.85%
Operating Income Generated 
Operating Income Generated
111,437 234,797
Per Employee $11,025 $5,540
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5.7% of their total assets compared to 5.2% for the larger carriers. 
The smaller carriers had available 217,405 seat miles for every dollar 
of operating income generated while the larger carriers made 
available 224,238 seat miles for every dollar of operating income 
derived. The smaller carriers did a little better than larger ones 
when operating income generated per employee was compared; 
$6356.89 for smaller carriers vs. $6,059,20 for the larger airlines.
After significant growth of some large carriers in 1986 via 
mergers and consolidations, the 1987 comparison gap for the two 
groups widens even more. Smaller carriers show a 7.85% figure for 
operating income as a percent of total assets while the larger carriers 
drop to 4.8%. The available seat miles per $1 of operating income 
generated drops to 111,437 for smaller carriers while it rises to 
234,797 for the larger airlines. Operating income generated per 
employee reflects an ever widening difference; up to $11,025 for 
smaller airlines and down to $5,546 for larger carriers.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Since the enactment of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, the 
road to profitability for the airlines, both large and small, has been a 
rough one. In recent years it seems to have smoothed out for most 
of the carriers but with a strong economy as has been experienced 
during recent years, it remains to be seen how the carriers will fare 
once the economy takes on a downward trend. The fact remains 
that up through 1987 the trend is positive for revenue passenger 
miles, load factor, operating revenues, and operating income. And 
the desired trend of down for the operating ratio seems to be in 
place.
Airline market shares have taken significant turns since deregula­
tion. Most of the larger carriers operating before deregulation lost 
significant emplacement market share in the initial years after
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deregulation. Many of these carriers have not yet regained the level 
they enjoyed before deregulation. Market share as far as gate 
control is concerned has increased for most of these larger carriers.
Mergers and acquisitions since deregulation had a significant 
impact on the airline industry structure. Seven major carriers exist 
today in place of the eleven trunk carriers operating in 1978. Many 
reasons can be cited for the recent wave of mergers - ranging from 
competitive reasons to the need to obtain additional aircraft. 
Whatever the reason, this consolidation of large carriers into even 
larger carriers has had a significant impact on carrier profitability and 
operating efficiency.
The major question asked in this paper is quite simple. As an air 
carrier becomes larger, does it become more efficient, does it 
become more profitable and do these increases occur more than 
proportionally? Operating income was used as the profitability 
measure. Operating ratio was the measure of efficiency. Total 
assets, available seat miles, and number of employees were utilized 
as indicators of airline size.
The analysis of profitability and efficiency according to the three 
size measures of the 13 U.S. airlines studies revealed some interest­
ing facts, but no simple answers. When examining the profitability 
factor of operating income, all three size measures indicated a 
significant correlation for 1978 and recent years. For the years 1979 
through 1983, the three measures confirmed no correlation. The 
reason for the sharp differences could be due to a number of factors. 
Factors such as the initial chaos caused by deregulation, the econ­
omy, statistical fluke, and others cannot be discounted. Based on 
this data, the three measures of firm size are not reliable predictors 
of a firm's operating efficiency. The fact that there is little or no 
correlation seems to indicate that firms of all sizes can operate 
efficiently or inefficiently. Larger firms do not necessarily have an 
advantage.
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When the 13 carriers were broken down into two groups based 
on size for 1985 and 1987, the differences between large and small 
carriers became more apparent. In 1985 both size categories 
showed significant correlation between size and operating profitabil­
ity, but only the smaller sized carriers showed a significant relation 
between size and operating efficiency. For 1987 the large carriers 
failed to show any relationship between size and either operating 
profitability or operating efficiency.
Examining differences between the two groups based on 
averages confirmed the correlations. For 1985 the smaller carriers 
fared better than larger carriers in terms of profitability and effi­
ciency. In 1987 the gap was even wider between the two group 
sizes, showing that the smaller carriers were both more profitable 
and efficient based on all three measures of size.
It would appear from this analysis that the question of larger 
airlines being more profitable and efficient is answered by a no. No 
statistical evidence of constant returns to scale, much less economies 
of scale exists. The correlation numbers generated for the larger 
airlines are generally statistically insignificant.
Analysis of the data indicated that the larger firms had more 
assets in relation to operating income than the smaller firms. That 
the assets are proportionately above the small carriers when operat­
ing profits are considered may imply that asset creation is being 
financed by heavy borrowing. The bulge in assets coupled with a 
higher operating ratio could also indicate that facilities are not being 
effectively utilized. The larger carriers could possibly handle new 
business with relatively little additional investment. That is to say, as 
they grow larger, they are becoming less efficient.
By whatever means carriers grow, internal expansion, acquisi­
tion, or merger, a number of major adjustments are inherent. The 
expansion is usually financed through increased debt which in­
creases interest expense. In the case of acquisition/merger there are
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expenses of rationalizing the combined fleet, consolidating mainte­
nance activities, merging reservation systems, combining manage­
ment, and dealing with union contracts. The additional non­
operating expenses often cause total costs to go up more than total 
revenues after intensive expansion, merger, or consolidation. All of 
these adjustments take time and resources. It remains to be seen if 
these "costs” will be rationalized in the long term.
The trend of airline consolidation forming larger and fewer 
carriers should not come as a total surprise. The airlines are fulfilling 
earlier predictions that only a handful of major carriers together with 
some healthy regional and commuter airlines would ultimately 
survive in the competitive intensity of a deregulated industry.
Airline industry officials have contended that competition will be 
preserved even at airports controlled by a single carrier because of 
the ample freedom for new airlines to enter the business. In such an 
environment, they say, any airline that charges monopoly prices will 
invite invasions of other carriers. But the major carriers are getting 
better at using their vast resources, such as computerized reservation 
systems, expansive flight schedules, and marketing resources to 
dominate smaller competitors. The price of entry is going up! 
Carriers are probably building barriers that competitors won't be 
able to penetrate. They are trying to achieve the market dominance 
that will give them better control of prices.
It would appear from this analysis that larger airlines are less 
efficient and profitable in proportion to their size than the smaller 
carriers. Because of the small sample in this analysis, further study is 
needed on this issue to arrive at any definitive answers. Answers are 
needed because of the important consequences for the future 
structure of the airline industry and the resulting impact on fares and 
service to the public if deregulation continues in its present form.
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